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STUDVNT NOTES
TRUST PREFERENCES OF DEPOSITORS IN BANK
INSOLVENCIES IN WEST VIRGINIA
The plaintiffs instituted suit for the purpose of having
declared as trust funds, deposits made by them after De-
cember 22, 1930, the date when the defendant bank was alleged
to have become insolvent. Their claims were established as trust
claims on that basis, but a similar trust claim of the state was held
to take priority and the funds in the hands of the receiver were in-
sufficient to pay the state. Reams Drug Store v. Bank of Monon-
gahela Valley.1
It was decided in the principal case that a bank is insolvent
when unable to pay its debts in the usual course of business.2
Whether or not the bank was hopelessly insolvent, and whether or
not the fact of such insolvency was actually known to its officials,
are questions of fact.3  Findings of fact by the lower court upon
conflicting evidence, will not be reversed, and will not be disturbed
unless contrary to the plain preponderance of the evidence.4
An acceptance of deposits under these circumstances consti-
tutes such a fraud as will entitle the depositor to a preferential
claim on the theory of constructive trust if he is able to trace the
res."
It is settled in this state that, when the relationship of trustee
and cestui que trust is once established, no subsequent dealing with
the trust property by the trustee can relieve it of the trust between
him and his cestui.0 So long as the trust fund may be identified
either as the original property or its product, equity will pursue
it.' Where a trustee bank wrongfully commingles the cestui's
money with its own, the courts have, as a practical matter, felt
compelled to relax the tracing requirements. It is no longer neces-
1174 S. E. 788 (W. Va. 1934). Other points passed upon by the court are
noted infra.
21Parker v. Bank, 96 Okla. 70, 220 Pac. 39 (1923); State v. Childers, 202
Iowa 1377, 212 N. W. 63 (1927).
3 Cronkleton v. Ebmeir, 38 F. (2d) 748 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930).
4 Hedrick v. Daly, 112 W. Va. 413, 164 S. E. 779 (1932); First Nat. Bank
v. McCloud, 112 W. Va. 537, 165 S. B. 799 (1932); Brown v. Brown, 111
W. Va. 324, 161 S. E. 555 (1931). Although the rule seems clear enough
the difficulty of proof of insolvency is a serious practical problem for counsel.
5 Board of Supervisors v. Bank, 138 Va. 333, 121 S. E. 903, 37 A. L. R.
604 (1924); Pennington v. Third Nat. Bank, 114 Va. 674, 77 S. E. 455(1913); Cherry v. Territory, 17 Okla. 221, 89 Pac. 192 (1906); Williams v.
Trust Co., 104 App. Div. 251, 93 N. Y. Supp. 821 (1905); see also -Notes(1922) 20 A. L. R. 1206 and (1932) 81 A. L. R. 1078 for list of cases.
e Marshall's Ex'r. v. Hall, 42 W. Va. 641, 26 S. E. 300 (1896); Murray v.
Sell, 23 W. Va. 475 (1884).
r Marshall's Ex'r v. Hall, supra n. 6.
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sary to identify the specific res; it is sufficient to trace it into the
bank's general funds and establish an augmentation of the bank's
assets." Trust claimants can recover at most, however, the lowest
cash balance of the bank during the interim between the wrongful
commingling and the receivership.9 The cestui has a charge or
lien against the commingled fund.10 The cash in the bank at the
time of its suspension and the cash deposits in correspondent banks
are to be considered as part of this fund."' One state at least has
gone so far as to permit a preference against all of the assets in-
cluding the proceeds of real estate, buildings and fixtures. 2 This
extension is unwarranted as it ignores elementary trust principles
and harshly affects the interests of general creditors. When the
bank withdraws money for its own purposes, it is presumed that
it withdrew its own portion first and the balance remaining is
subject to the trust.1 3  This presumption will not be exercised so
as to defeat the trust.' There is some authority to the effect that
the presumption is not applicable to a trust ex malificio"5 but the
weight of authority is otherwise.'
6
As between the depositor and the bank, the ordinary pre-
sumption is, that money paid in is paid out in the same order iu
which it was deposited.' 7  The plaintiffs in the principal case in
s Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, 181 N. E. 369 (Ind. App. 1932); Andrews
v. Savings Bank, 209 Iowa 1147, 229 N. W. 907 (1930); Pennington v. Third
Nat.'Bank, supra n. 5. See also Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 125 for long list
of cases.
D James Rosco (Bolton) Limited v. Winder, 1 Ch. 62 (1915); see also
SCOTT, CASES ON TauSTS (2d ed. 1931) 495.
10 Terre Haute Trust Co. v. Scott, supra n. 8; Forsythe v. Nat. Bank, 185
Minn. 255, 241 N. W. 66 (1932); Bank v. Millspaugh, 314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W.
706 (1926); Bank v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 279 (1924); Yellowstone
County v. Bank, 46 Mont. 439, 128 Pac. 596 (1912); Whitcomb v. Carpenter,
134 Iowa 227, 111 N. W. 825 (1907).
11 Reichert v. United Savings Bank, 255 Mich. 685, 239 N. W. 393 (1931);
Meyers v. Fed. Res. Bank, 101 Fla. 407, 134 So. 600 (1931); Central Trust
Co. v. Mullens, 108 W. Va. 12, 150 S. B. 137 (1929). This is subject, of
course, to the correspondent bank's right to offset its claims against the
defunct bank. The presumption should be rebuttable since it might be shown
that no part of the credit with a correspondent bank was based on the com-
mingled fund, as where the credit with a correspondent was based entirely
upon transactions prior in time to the wrongful commingling.
12 State ex rel. Sorenson v. Farmers' Bank, 237 N. W. 857 (Neb. 1931).
'3 See exhaustive collection of cases in Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 141-144.
14 Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 160.
15 Yesner v. Com'r. of Banks, 252 Mass. 358, 148 N. E. 224 (1925); Rug-
ger v. Hammond, 95 Wash. 85, 163 Pac. 408 (1917) ; Nixon v. Bank, 180 Ala.
291, 60 So. 868 (1913).
:l eSupra n. 13.
17 Clayton's Case, 1 Meriv. 572, 35 Eng. Rep. 781 (1816). The court in
the principal case compdres the positions of a depositor of $2000 before in-
2
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order to establish as large trust claims as possible urged that rule
be applied to withdrawals made during the insolvency period.
The court, however, discarded the presumption and relied on
another to the effect that the bank would act rightfully, and as the
depositors drew on their accounts, return the wrongfully accepted
deposits. The result of the principal case is to improve the rela-
tive position of the general depositor at the expense of a general
depositor who is also asserting a trust claim, since the former is
allowed, in effect, to share the trust fund of the latter. The court's
presumption is an obvious fiction. In honoring checks after in-
solvency the bank is acting in the normal manner and the pre-
sumption appropriate to such dealings should be applied.
Generally, deposits of checks on the bank itself are treated
as an augmentation of assets."8 But the court in the principal
case adopted the minority view that assets are not increased as
there is nothing more than a shifting of book credits.9 If the de-
positor had cashed the check and then deposited the money he
would have been able to assert his claim. Why make him go
through these useless motions in order to protect himself? In-
directly the court is again permitting the -general creditor to share
in that which is properly a part of the trust res. In County Court
of Monongalia County v. Bank of the Monongahela Valley,20 three
banks merged leaving the surviving bank, which later failed, with
county deposits of $160,000. The legal maximum of county de-
posits being $100,000 the court held that the excess of $60,000 was
an illegal deposit and constituted a trust fund in behalf of the
county. In fact this transaction was no more than a shifting of
book credits although it was treated like an original deposit. This
case is weakened as an analogy because the cases do not require
solvency and a depositor of $1000 before and $1000 after, if the first in,
first out doctrine were applied. The example is not persuasive since the first
depositor was never entitled to any other rights than those incident to the
debtor-creditor relationship.
'8 Miami v. First Nat. Bank, 58 P. (2d) 561 (C. C. A. 5th, 1932) ; Tooele
County Board of Educ. v. Hadlock, 11 Pae. (2d) 320 (Utah 1932); Trust
Co. v. Bank, 37 Wyo. 216, 260 Pac. 534 (1921); Bank v. Millspaugh, supra
n. 10; Bank v. Peters, supra n. 10; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover
State Bank, 109 Kans. 772, 204 Pac. 992 (1921); the latter two cases were
cited with approval upon a slightly different proposition in Central Trust Co.
v. Mullens, supra n. 11.
19 See list of cases in Note (1933) 82 A. L. R. 101.
20 112 W. Va. 476, 164 S. E. 659 (1932). For a discussion of this case
see (1932) 39 W. VA. L. q. 180.
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augmentation and tracing when illegal deposits of funds of a
governmental unit are involved.
2 1
It has been settled in West Virginia that the state has a pref-
erence over common creditors and that sureties of the state de-
posits may be subrogated to this right.22 Thus, in the principal
case, the deposits of the state prior to December 22d, within the
amount of the bonds were simply entitled to a general preference
over common creditors. The excess over the bonds becomes a trust
fund entitled to trust preference.23 But as to the amount the state
deposited during the insolvency period, the state became a cestui
just as the plaintiffs did.24  Express trusts seemingly by consent of
counsel for all parties, had been paid, and the state never claimed
that preference existed as to those trusts. Should the state's
prerogative be extended to include cases where the interests of
trust claimants are involved? A cestui has a proprietary interest
which is quite different from the personal claim of a general de-
positor. The plaintiffs, having traced their monies to the court's
satisfaction, have, theoretically, identified their own property. If
there is not enough to pay all trust claims they should share pro
rata.25 That the state's trust claim is given priority over private
trust claims goes far to reveal the true function of the construstive
trust theory in bank insolvency cases, namely, - to effect prefer-
ential treatment where, in the light of banking practice and busi-
ness needs, justice requires it, regardless of the limitations of com-
mon trust principles. In the case of the state's trust preference it
is not a matter of an adjustment between individuals but of pro-
tecting public interests deemed to outweight the interests of pri-
vate trust claimants.
-R. E. HAGBERG.
21 San Diego County v. Calif. Nat. Bank. 52 Fed. 59 (C. C. S. . Cal.
1892) (County funds); Farmer's Savings Bank v. City of Hamburg, 204
Iowa 1083, 216 N. W. 748 (1927) (City funds).
22 Woodward v. Sayre, 90 W. Va. 295, 110 S. E. 689, 24 A. L. R. 1497
(1922).
2s Reichart v. Bank, supra n. 11.
24 See cases, supra n. 5.
2 sYesner v. Com'r. of Banks, supra n. 15; see also Cunningham v. Brown,
265 U. S. 1, 44 S. Ct. 424 (1923); People v. Trust Co., 175 Cal. 756, 167
Pac. 388 (1917), Contra, In re Bolognesi & Co., 254 Fed. 770 (C. C. A. 2d,
1918).
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